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Some Nonlinear Dynamic Models of Strike
Response to Region Defense
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The coordination of information acquisition and interpretation to direct force
application is increasingly recognized as a crucial military systems design and
investment issue. This paper illustrates tradeoffs between Blue/own regional
Attacker sensor and shooter capabilities: it studies a deep strike or SCUD-
hunting scenario in a low-resolution, aggregated manner using an analytical
state-space approach that recognizes gross aggregated regional Defender (Red),
and regional Attacker (Blue), system capabilities and limitations. Emphasis is
accordingly placed on explicitly modeling the availability and utilization of
information to a striking Attacker, as it becomes available from a realistically
finite sensor and C2 capability. The (imperfect) information on opposition units,
the Defenders, that are candidates for prosecution by the Attackers is passed to
the finite, hence saturable (here missile-firing) Attacking force, the shooters, that
then responds by prosecuting those units.
The models specifically recognize that regional Defenders will not be detected
immediately, nor recognized perfectly, nor are Defender shots (e.g. SCUD
launcher) fired perfectly, or immediately. Furthermore, attempts to effectively
target are also realistically modeled as afflicted by imperfect Attacker battle damage
assessment (BDA), an incapability that, if pronounced, will non-linearly saturate
shooters, increase their response times, and hence reduce targeting effectiveness
and efficient ammunition expenditures. Such models can allow for adaptation by
both attackers and defenders to recent fortunes: if Defender presence and activity
is effectively countered by Attackers, then the former may tend to be deterred or
withdraw; if not, the Defenders are motivated to press their apparent advantage.
Sharp, threshold-like, responses can follow from the possibly multi-stable
dynamics. This behavior will be explored in a second report (Part II).
The present models are mainly deterministic or pseudo-stochastic in that they
represent the non-linear effect of stochastic saturation approximately, but
adequately. However, they can straightforwardly be "made stochastic",
especially Markovian, and so realized using Monte Carlo simulations. Computer
programs exist to provide numerical results; some are given. A simple one-
dimensional stochastic (Markov birth-death) model is given as an appendix to
Part II. This model can be shown analytically and numerically to exhibit
"stochastic bi-stability" properties that under certain circumstances (parameter
combinations) lead to bimodal steady-state distributions. Such a tendency will
occur also in more detailed,,but less analytically tractable models.
There are many problem elements that have been initially and purposefully
ignored. They will be addressed in later work. For instance, the effects of
different target types, false targets, and decoys must be added (some "decoys"
are in effect present, in the form of killed Defenders, not so recognized, that are
mistakenly re-targeted). The effect of different principles for Attacker target
prioritization under uncertainty, i.e. dynamic scheduling, requires systematic
attention. In the present models Attackers are invulnerable to attack; this is not
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always realistic, and can be changed to a duel-like scenario involving
suppression of enemy (Defender) air defense (SEAD); a paper on this topic is in
progress. In the current paper Attackers employ generic missiles only, but the
use of (vulnerable, manned) Attack aircraft can similarly be modeled, as can
combinations of Attack aircraft, Naval gunfire, and missiles, recognizing the
coordination difficulties. Employment of cued reconnaissance aircraft, possibly
UAVs, can likewise be represented quantitatively as state-space components. In
addition, refinements that more faithfully represent spatial and perhaps other
environmental constraints can be incorporated, as can details of communications
assets and message-handling protocols in use by both Attackers and Defenders.
The present papers describe some of the possibilities for insights inherent in
an enhanced state-space approach. As pointed out, many elaborations are
possible. The objective is to recognize only that detail in the (preliminary) models
that is sufficient to hint at payoff from adding suitable assets and strategies at
appropriate points in the entire system. Finer detail and resolution is left to
others to include, and possibly profit by. More elaborate and high-resolution
models within such tools as NSS (METRON), and JWARS eventually can focus
with greater intensity on some of the issues raised here.
In general we believe that this report is in accord with many of the views and
suggestions of Hachinski (1996), and also of Dockery and Woodcock (1993), and
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1. Problem Formulation: Scenarios and Analytical Strategy
Consider this generic scenario: Defenders (Red units) enter a region, ft,, in
which they assemble, and that they wish to occupy and defend. Their purpose is
to prepare to oppose the friendly/own (Blue Attacker) assets that, for example,
may be intending to carry out an amphibious landing. Alternatively, the Red
Defenders may simply intend to move about ft, and occasionally shoot harassing
missiles in the fashion of TEL/SCUD systems at the time of the Gulf War; in this
case the Blue Attacker facilities may be of lesser and different capability; see the
OR/MS thesis of Munson (1996). Counter-fire could, in future, also at some stage
come from a Navy force located near, but offshore from ft,
.
The region ft, is assumed to be under Blue surveillance; furthermore, each
Red shot occasion is an opportunity for detection and response by a Blue
Attacker. Response to Reds means that the Attacker shoots at the Defender after
the latter has reached the "head of the line" of a queue or target list of others who
have come to Attacker attention. Target priorities that order targets in urgency
classes in the shooting queue are not yet considered here; the effect of such must
be addressed subsequently. The priorities should be time and experience related,
and established dynamically to recognize the uncertainty of target list identities.
Also, all targets in the present model have the same value; this must be subject to
change. The present model does account explicitly for possible shooter saturation
or overload: the same is true for the overall Blue sensor force. And the analysis is
purposefully made time-dependent, although simple steady-state results are of
some interest to gain insight as to particular combinations of parameters.
Suppose further that Attacker (Blue) probability of (Red) kill is pk) ideally, if a
fired-upon Defender is killed, he/she is known to be no longer a threat; while, if
missed, he/she returns to the pool of Defenders that are candidates for more
"service", i.e. retargeting. Note that, more realistically, pk might depend on the
load or backlog of Defender-shooters revealed by Blue's sensors; the sensor, and
Blue shooters' opportunities are enhanced by the Reds' recent shooting activities.
The kill probability, p^, could plausibly eventually decrease with increases in
such load because of delays in prosecuting targets: such delays give opportunity
for the target to move or evade. The initial model treats pk as a constant
(implicitly depending on only the average range of defender weapon fire that
reaches the region of attacker location). This feature is a strong candidate for
refinement in several ways.
Our models specifically recognize that after a target is fired upon there is a
battle-damage assessment (BDA) step taken by the Attacker force. Realistically,
BDA is imperfect. In the present models BDA success is explicitly represented by
conditional probabilities that reflect the chance of BDA error. One operating
characteristic of BDA is the conditional probability that the Blue C4ISR system
concludes that the target is alive, given that the Blue Attacker's response actually
killed the Red target; denote this by c,ia . Also there is a non-zero probability that
the target is perceived by the Blue BDA system to be dead, given that the attack
shot actually missed, so the target is actually alive; denote this error probability
by ca d. Note that if Cda > 0, as is realistic, an additional — and potentially
unnecessary— load is gradually imposed on the Blue shooters, and this slows
Blue's effective response to Red presence and opposition potential. Of course,
rapid invasion of the region by Defenders should give rise to many detections of
Red units by Blue, which initially produces many opportunities but, if continued,
subsequently loads up and may saturate the Blue Attack capability, reducing its
responsiveness. Consequently it is important to adapt the Attacker force size and
capabilities to adequately and cost-effectively control a perceived Defense
intensity in the region. An adaptive control feature that regulates and allocates
scarce attack assets has been added to our model sequence in Part II.
A further realistic feature of the present models is the possibility that Red
units under surveillance may be lost, and hence returned to undetected status.
Such a loss can be caused by a deliberate Red policy of occasionally leaving
region fl\ or hiding within it temporarily in order to shake off Blue pursuit and
prosecution. Additionally, losses from surveillance can also occur inadvertently
because of system inability to maintain effective contact, perhaps as a result of
terrain properties, but also target action. The present models do not include the
highly realistic presence of false targets, either of natural origin or deliberately
introduced by Red as decoys. See Figure 1.1.
The purpose of this report is to provide first-step tools with which to
investigate and describe certain tradeoffs and opportunities available in the sort
of situation described. We begin by analyzing what may be the simplest
reasonable analytical model(s) that suggest themselves. The models are here first
exercised in a deterministic, approximately expected-value mode so as to quickly
and efficiently explore for sensitivities or the "knees in the curves" beloved by
analysts. In some cases quite simple but suggestive analytical (actually algebraic)
solutions are possible; more comprehensive time-dependence effects are
available by package computer programs that solve non-linear differential
equations, e.g. MATLAB, or MATHEMATICA. Stochastic versions of some of the
models have been formulated, and run in VISUAL BASIC; a simple example is
available from the authors; it runs under Windows95. Such simulations promise
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O Undetected Red Units
® Detected, Alive (possibly previously targeted)
EJ Detected, Dead (BDA classified as alive; targeted)
Figure 1.1
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to furnish preliminary rough but economical understanding of the rather
complex, uncertain, and adaptive phenomena under study. The latter can guide
further higher-resolution work, if desired. Computer run times are quite short in
the models proposed, so exploration of alternatives is expedited.
The modeling strategy espoused is that of first exploring the conflict in an
aggregated low-resolution broad-brush fashion using simple state-space models.
This can be done quickly at minimal cost in the scarcest of analyst resources:
time. Suggestions from such aggregated models can then be investigated at
higher fidelity and at suitably detailed level using more elaborate models, such
as perhaps NSS, GCAMS, or the NPS exploratory campaign model JWAEP, and,
eventually, JWARS. We think of the present low-resolution models as tentative
and subject to modification (often quickly and easily), both in response to the
judgments and interests of analysts, and as a consequence of comparison with
high-fidelity/resolution model runs; ideally, comparisons might even be made
with exercise or true combat data. We believe that such interplay between model
levels is a healthy and profitable way to carry out military modeling in support
of analysis and understanding. Ultimately, models are formulated so as to enrich
the vision and insights of analysts, at best providing insights at relatively low
cost in time and money.
2. Model I: Surveillance Target Classification (Delayed Saturable BDA)
Consider this model: Defending Red units enter region (fi» at a specified rate.
They are the subject of a prescribed level of surveillance/reconnaissance, are
identified (possibly incorrectly) as alive, and are eventually targeted by members
of a group of Attacking Blue shooters. As a result, some are killed and remain in
the region unclassified until revisited by the surveillance system; at this point the
error-prone classification service occurs, and a dead Red may be classified as
alive and is ultimately (and wastefully) retargeted. Live Red units in the region
are similarly found by the sensor system and targeted, perhaps after several
previous attempts have been made to shoot them. If a Defender is a TEL, and if it
fires a (SCUD) missile, it is presumed to be quickly detected (although its track
may be lost before prosecution). When an unclassified but dead Red unit in the
region is finally classified as dead that unit is in future considered to be non-
existent; this may take considerable time, during which it is effectively a decoy.
Red units may be lost to Blue's surveillance because of a variety of Red
actions: for example, a TEL may take refuge in a prepared hideout, perhaps
under a bridge. Such losses to detection and surveillance are assumed in the
models to occur at a (user-specified) constant rate. Units, once lost, are subject to
reacquisition at the same rate as newly arrived units. Units in hiding presumably
cannot fire weapons (launch SCUDs).
The setup describes a certain kind of (imperfect) delayed information
processing concerning the perceived state of both newly-arrived and previously
engaged live targets, but also the state of targeted Defenders that have been killed
but not yet classified.
The above setup represents a system that includes a form of effectively
delayed BDA; it is one that depends on the general rate of surveillance of the
region of interest. A subsequent model addresses the implications of a
classification system tied more closely to the shooters.
Parameters of Model I
A(t) = Defender arrival rate into region V^ . The assumption of a constant
arrival rate actually permits an explicit steady-state solution to be
found, for what that is worth. One can perhaps string such together
to represent various stages of arrival, during which the system
reaches quasi-stationarity. The model also represents a situation in
which an initial number of red Defenders is present in R , with no
reinforcements.
\x = Service rate of an attacker {1/ja = mean time for an Attacker to track,
shoot, flight time of missile).
pK = Probability an attacked target is killed. This parameter is presently
taken to be range-dependent only on average.
v = Track-loss rate (1/ v = mean of a holding time of Defender in track).
Once a unit track is lost, it is no longer a viable target for Blue
service.
a = Defender (e.g. TEL = SCUD launcher) shoot rate (I/a = mean time
between shots by a single Defender). This parameter is irrelevant
under certain circumstances.
7 = Rate Defenders leave region (1/7= mean holding time of Defender
unit in region), or hide within region.
£ = Rate undetected /tracked Defenders are acquired by sensors/C2
system.
S£> = Number of Attacker-shooters; these are viewed as individual servers
that engage Defender targets for a given time.
raa = Probability that a target that is alive is classified as being alive by the
sensors/C2 system. l-raa = Tad = P(target classified or perceived as
dead I alive).
rda = Probability that a dead target is misclassified as being alive.
Any or all of the above parameters can be dependent upon time, at the discretion
of the analyst. We maintain constants for very preliminary steady-state analysis.
State Variables for Model I
The following state variables are needed to describe the present dynamical
system:
Ru {t) = Number of undetected live (hence potentially active and threatening)
Red Defenders present in region V± at time t.
Rd(t) = Number of detected live Red Defenders present at time t. These are
on the Blue Attacker-shooter's target list, and will be engaged unless
lost by the sensor system (they may go into hiding, or even leave the
region covered by the surveillance, e.g. JSTARS).
D{t) = Number of detected and perceived to be alive, hence potentially Blue-
Attacker-targeted, but actually dead Red Defenders at t. These are
present because Blue battle damage assessment (BDA) is realistically
imperfect.
M(t) = Number of dead Defenders in the region that are not yet classified.
Classification is done by the Blue surveillance /reconnaissance
system.
For the deterministic modeling of saturable service by the Attack shooters
(presumably missiles in the present context, although Attack aircraft can also be
represented) we make use of the following approximation, cf. Filipiak (1988),
Agnew (1976), and also Rider (1967), for the rate of processing by the Blue
shooters,
Hs (f) S H(^(0+D(f);/z,sD )
_
[Rd (t) + D{t)]fisD
l + [Rd (t) + D(t)]'
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(2.1a)
State Transition Equations for Model I
^ ^J Rd (t) + D(t) SWL ^XJ --i->;
Arrival w£l_i LL, Rate of
rate Blue service rate of live Defenders track loss
that results in failure/missed shot
*n(0(«+r) - W)
Defenders leaving region Surveillance/recon.
and detections caused by system detection and
Red activity (a) correct classification
(as alive)
^= fcA.(0 + «R»(0 - (r+v)i?,(o - -M-hs (,) (2.1b)
at > v ' -—»—' < v ' Kd {t) + U{t)
Surv./Recon. Detection Rate of leaving * » '
detection and by Red region and track Rate of Blue shooting
classification action loss at live Defenders
as alive




M RM) + D(t) sw
Rate of Surv./Recon. > » <
detection and Rate of shooter service
incorrect classification of dead (misclassif.
of dead targets as live) Defenders










Rd (t) + D(t)
w Rd (t) + D(t)
SK,H
Service of dead Service rate of live
but perceived Defenders that results
as live Defenders in success /kill
Long-Run Solutions
In order to investigate the possible long-run or steady-state behavior of the
various state variables, and to compute answers to some interesting operational
questions, look at solutions to the equations obtained by setting the derivatives
equal to zero when X(t) = A, a constant; these are fixed points to which, under
certain conditions, the system will eventually settle.
= X +-^-Hs[l-pK ] + vRd -Ru (a + y)-?;raaRu (2.2a)Kd +U
= fyaaRu + aRu - (7 + v)Rd --%-HS (2.2b)Kd +D
= %rdaM —Hs (2.2c)^ Rd +D b
= -|M + ° He +—^—HepK (2.2d)* Rd + D S Rd +D br
Solving forM in (2.2c) and substituting the result into (2.2d) results in
D = Rd^pK =cRd . (2.3)
rdd
Multiplying (2.2b) by (1 - p%) and adding to (2.2a) results in
Q = X + (vpK -r(l-pK ))Rd ~ Ru (<XPK + 7 + fraaPK ) • (2«4)
Thus,
RU = K1 + K2Rd (2-5)
where
Ki= £ : (2.6a)
ypK - 7(l-pK ) (26b)
aPK+fraaPK+7
Special Case: y= (rate at which alive Defenders leave the region is 0)
If 7= 0, then adding equations (2.2a) - (2.2b) results in
= A--%-HspK (2.7)
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1 + c l + (l + c)Rrf
where c is defined in (2.3).
Thus,
= X + A(l + c)Rrf -^DKdPK • (2-9)




The steady-state number of active Defenders in the region when 7= and
(2.10) holds is
Ru + Rd =K1 + (K2 + l)Rd




Examination of the final (right-most) term in (2.11) shows that, if the BDA
error probability rda is at all substantial, the queue of waiting targets (many
actually dead) skyrockets non-linearly. This is the result of wasteful retargeting.
It is therefore a prime technical objective of the Attacker to reduce r^fl; otherwise
it will be necessary for Attacker/Blue to shoot faster (or with greater effect),
wastefully using up its ammunition inventory. The same general effect can also
occur if the Defender region departure or concealment rate, 7, is positive but
relatively small compared to Defender's action rate, a. If this is not so the current
model would permit Defenders to, somewhat futilely, enter the region and leave
without shooting. This latter tactic actually might be feasible if only to escape
possible detection, or, if suspected to be detected, to escape before actual
11
engagement. Or, simply to tie up Attacker forces that might otherwise be used
elsewhere.
General Case: y>
If 7> 0, then Ra satisfies the quadratic equation
= (A - jKt) + Rd [(l - 7*CiXl + c)~ VSDPK ~ 7(^2 + 1)] " 7{K2 + 1)(1 + c)RJ. (2.12)
Define








4(K2 + l)(l + c)
(2.13)
A- 9K1
A-^ ?L{cc + fraa)pK (2.14)
(<* + fc»)PlC + 7
and that the quadratic equation for i^, (2.12), will have only one positive root,
and this provides the long-run value of Rd- The Ru comes from (2.5), and that of
D from (2.3).
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3. Model II: Simplified Surveillance with Immediate BDA
We introduce next a model that parsimoniously represents salient features of
the posited long-range Blue response to the Red Defense of fl\ assembly
situation. It is also simple enough to permit explicit algebraic solution for long-
run or steady-state behavior, if such exists. The latter formulas allow very
convenient automated exploration by such devices as ANTS (Active Nonlinear
Tests of Complex Simulation Models), developed by J.H. Miller of Carnegie-
Mellon University and the Sante Fe Institute.
In this model there is assumed to be additional ability for the shooter server
to conduct BDA immediately after firing.
Additional Parameters of Model II
caa = Probability that a Defender that is alive is classified as alive
immediately after it has been fired upon. 1 - Caa = cad = P(Defender
classified or perceived as dead I alive).
Cda = Probability that a dead Defender is misclassified as being alive
immediately after being fired upon. 1 - Cda = Cdd = P(Defender
classified or perceived as dead I dead).
The state variables considered are these:
State Variables for Model II
We need the following variables to describe system evolution:
Ru (t) = Number of undetected live (hence potentially active and threatening)
Red Defenders present in region H. at time t.
Rd(t) = Number of detected live Red Defenders present at time t. These are
on the Blue Attacker-shooter's target list, and will be engaged unless
lost by the sensor system (some may go into hiding, or even leave
the region covered by Blue surveillance, e.g. JSTARS).
D(t) = Number of detected and perceived to be alive, hence potentially Blue-
targeted, but actually dead Red Defenders at t. These are present
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because Blue battle damage assessment (BDA) is realistically
imperfect.
In this model Blue Attackers ignore the Red Defenders that are dead and
once-perceived to be dead; if a dead target is ever so classified, it is thereafter
omitted from consideration. In this model, classification (BDA) is modeled as
carried out soon (immediately) after a Blue Attacker engages/shoots at a Red
Defender.
State Transition Equations for Model II














Blue service / shoot rate (at live Red target) Probability ("dead" back
to undetected)
+ RAfy -RM&aa- RMa - Ruitjy
Alive lost by New New detections Red Defenders
surveillance detections caused by leave region
system (sensors) Red activity
(shooting)
)= Ru (t)fym + Ru (t)a -Rd (t)y- Rd (t)v
(3.2a)
dt
New sensor Activity Leave Alive lost by










Blue kills an alive Red,
misclass. as alive
H{Rd {t) + D(t);ii,sD )-cdd
(3.2c)
Rd {t) + D(t)





1 + [R(j(t) + D(0
]
Solutions
In order to investigate the long-run behavior of the various state variables,
and to compute answers to some interesting operational questions, look at
solutions to the equations obtained by setting the derivatives equal to zero when
X(t) = A, a constant; these are the fixed points to which, under certain conditions,
the system will eventually settle.
= A + -^--[clKcad\H{Rd +D;fi,sD)+ vRd -{a + Y)Ru - fyaaK (3.3a)Kd +U
= aRu +fcA - (r + v)Rd --^-{qKcad + pK )H{Rd + D;n,sD ) (3.3b)Kd + U
= irr^[PKCdaMRd +D;ii,8D)--^—cddH(Rd +D;n,sD ) (3.3c)Kd + U Kd + U
where
c}K = l-PK-










Rd +D 1 , PKJi-Cdd)
'
cdd
To eliminate the nonlinear term from the first two equations (3.3a) - (3.3b)
multiply the first by (cjKCad +- PK) and the second by q^Cad and add to obtain
= [A + vRd - [fym + a + y)Ru \qKcad + pK ) + [(few + <*)&u - (7 + v)&d)flKPad- (3 -6 )
Simplify:





J<u = 77 \ + 7T \ Kd W-°J
= L +MRd . (3.9)
To find Rd, insert (3.9) and (3.4) into (3.3b) and solve for Rd .





Adding equations (3.3a) - (3.3b) results in





= A[l + (l + c)l^]-^DPK«d
= A + Rd {A(l + c)-/isD pK }.
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Hence,
= X +—— qKcadjusD
L + C
= X-ysD pK
1 , v 0-+c)Rd
l + (l+ c)Rd -TTc
(cjKCad+PK)lJSD




= X + Rd{A(l+c)-jJsD pK}.








In the unrealistic but instructive case in which Defenders never leave the
region we can thus see directly the effects of BDA misclassification. The steady-
state number of active Defenders in the region when 7= is




{fraa+(*)PK fc+«) 1- X l + PK cdc
^-CdaV*dPk
We see from the last term in (3.14) that increases in cda can result in more sizable,
rapid, and non-linear increases in the total active Defenders, Ru + Rd, than do
increases in cad ; the latter is also influential but only linearly. This behavior
occurs because cda > results in unnecessary work by the shooting server and
can result in system overload. The C2 server is recognized to be equivalent to a
deterministic infinite server, which cannot be saturated — a feature that is a
candidate for change. This model differs only slightly from Model I but it is
simpler.
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Comparison of (3.14) with (2.11) in the case in which r&a = aa shows that the
alive Red population, Ru + Rd, is smaller for the present immediate BDA model,
Model II. In this case Ru is smaller for Model II than Model I, while Rd is the same
for both models.
General Case: y>
If 7> 0, then Rd satisfies the quadratic equation
= (A-^) + [(A-7L)(l+c)-/isD pK -y(M + l)]Rd -r(M + l)(l+c)^ (3.15)
Define
q = [{X- yL)(l + c)-/jsdPk - y(M + 1)]
2
+ 4(A - yL)y{M + 1)(1 + c)
= {X-yL)2
\





(M + l)(l + c)
X-yL
(3.16)
X-yL = ^rga + a)VK (3.17)
and that the quadratic equation for Rd (3.15) will have one positive root. That
positive root is given by
(X - yL){\ + c) - nsDpK - y(M + 1) + JqRj = (3.19)
2y(M + l)(l + c)
Note that c is given by (3.10),M by (3.8), q by (3.16). From this formula we can get
an explicit algebraic expression for Ru from (3.8), and for D from (3.4).
Numerical Examples
Two measures of evaluation (MOE) are the rate of Defender attrition
Rd Rd + D Rd
Rj+D 1 + Rj+D 1 + Rd + D
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and the rate of Defender firing (shooting)
(p=(Ru +Rd)a.
Figures 3.1 - 3.11 present results of the two models. Figures 3.1 - 3.10 plot rate
of Defender firing, (p, versus rate of Defender attrition, pr, for various values of
a, the firing rate per Defender. The value of each rate is plotted with a symbol for
each value of a. The model parameters for Figures 3.1 - 3.6 are A = 10, pk - 0.7,
7= 0.5, v = 20, r^a = rad - c&a = cad = 0.3. In each figure the rates of firing per
Defender, a, are 0.1, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, ..., 4.5, 5. In Figures 3.1- 3.3, the rate of
Attacker-shooter service, jjsd = 25. In Figures 3.4 - 3.6, the rate of Attacker-
shooter service, jjlsd = 50. In Figures 3.1 and 3.4, the Attacker-sensor acquisition
rate | = 1. In Figures 3.2 and 3.5, the Attacker-sensor acquisition rate £ = 5. In
Figures 3.3 and 3.6, the sensor acquisition rate £ = 10.
The immediate BDA model always results in a higher rate of Defender
attrition for the same rate of Defender firing. However, the difference becomes
negligible for large £,, the rate at which sensors acquire the Defenders. The
difference is larger when the rate of shooting service, \is~d = 50, (in Figures 3.4 -
3.6) than when fiSD = 25, (in Figures 3.1 - 3.3) for the same values of £. This
behavior results from the increased number of undetected Defenders, Ru , in the
delayed BDA model. Note that for small £, the increase in the rate of Defender
attrition is more responsive to change in the firing rate per Defender, a;
Defenders are then more often discovered when they reveal themselves. For
large surveillance rate, £, the rate of Defender attrition is almost constant as a
function of a. Not surprisingly, for small £, a Defender is more likely to be
detected just after it fires than before.
In Figure 3.7, v = 0, % = 1, jjsq = 10 and fisr> = 25 with the other parameters the
same. Note that when ^sd = 10, the difference between immediate BDA and
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delayed BDA is negligible. This is because the Attacking-shooting server is
saturated although the acquisition rate £ is relatively small. The effect of
increasing the missile firing rate to /zsp = 25 is to decrease the rate of Defender
shooting by decreasing Rd', further, since the shooting server is not now saturated
there is a larger difference in the rate of Defender attrition between immediate
and delayed BDA.
In Figure 3.8, t, = 1, jjsd = 25 and v, the rate at which detected Defenders are
lost from track, is set equal first to and then to 10. Note the anticipated higher
rate of Defender attrition for v = 0, and also the accompanying decrease in rate of
Defender shooting attributable to the decrease in R u + Rd, the Defender
population available to fire missiles.
In Figure 3.9, v = 0, jjsd = 10 and £, the rate of surveillance/reconnaissance, is
first set equal to 1, and then raised to 20. There is no apparent difference between
immediate and delayed BDA for £ = 20; live targets are reacquired relatively
quickly. Further, as a increases, the saturation of the shooting server makes the
rate of Defender attrition equal for £, = 1 and £ = 20. The present Blue Attacking
shooter force can not profit by the increased acquisition capability.
In Figure 3.10, £ = 10, v = 20, X = 10, y= 0.5, pk = 0.7 and jjsd = 25. One curve,
with larger rate of Defender attrition, corresponds to rad = rda = cad = Cda = 0.3.
The lower curve corresponds to higher error probabilities, arbitrarily rad = rda =
Cad = Cda = 0.5. The less-effective BDA results in a decrease of about 5 in the rate of
Defender attrition and an increase of about 10 in the rate of Defender shooting
rate for a = 4.0, 4.5 and 5. The difference between immediate and delayed BDA is
small because of the comparatively high rate of Blue surveillance/
reconnaissance, £ = 10.
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In Figure 3.11, X = 10, % = l,pK = 0.7, v = 20 and usjj = 25. The rate at which
Defenders leave the region is 7= 9a where a= 1 and 6 = 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1, 2, ..., 10. If
6 < 1 then delayed BDA results in a larger Defender shooting rate than
immediate BDA. As the rate at which Defenders leave the region becomes larger
than the firing rate per Blue Attacker, the rates of Defender shooting for
immediate BDA and delayed BDA become essentially the same. The rate of
Defender attrition is always below the rate of Defender shooting but the rates
become comparable as the rate of Defender departure from the region becomes
greater.
Numerical Example: Nonstationary Results
In this example there is a maximum number of Red Defenders, M, which
enter the region at a linearly increasing rate, X(t) = Xt, for t < Tm where Tm =
J—— ; note that the total number of arrivals is f M Xs ds =M
.
In Figures 3.12 - 3.15, the total number of Defenders M = 50 and X = 5; thus,
Tm = V20 is the time at which all Defenders have entered the region. Other
parameters are as follows: the track loss rate v = 0.5; the detection rate t, = 0.1; the
Red activity rate a = 0.5; the Blue service rate jjsd = 12; the probability of kill
pK - 0-7; the probability a live Red target detected by a Blue sensor is classified as
live, raa - 0.8; and the probability Blue classifies an alive Red as dead, cad = 0.7.
The Defenders do not leave the area; 7= 0.
In Figures 3.12 - 3.13, the probability with which Blue correctly classifies a
dead Red as dead is c^d = 0.2. This rather low figure is reflected in a dramatic
growth in the backlog of already-dead targets and in a correspondingly drawn
out campaign. In Figures 3.14 - 3.15, Cdd = 0.8. Figures 3.12 and 3.14 present the
number of alive Red and dead Red targets (but not yet classified as dead) waiting
for or being served by the Blue shooters for Model n. When Cdd = 0.2, the number
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of dead Red targets that are misclassified as alive and are awaiting retargeting is
much larger than the number of live targets waiting to be served by the Blue
shooters. The Blue shooters are saturated by the misclassified dead Red targets.
Figures 3.13 and 3.15 present the accumulated number of Blue shots, Red shots,
and Reds that are killed for Model II; also presented is the number of Red
Defenders alive at time t. Comparison of Figures 3.13 and 3.15 indicates that the
saturation of the Blue shooters by dead Red targets when c^d = 0.2 decreases
Blue's ability to prosecute alive Red targets. This impairment results in Red
Defenders being alive for a far longer period of time and being able to shoot
many more times. Further, Blue wastes much ammunition retargeting dead Red
targets.
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4. Model III: Command and Control Delays Explicitly Represented
The previous models are next extended to reflect realistic delays in
classification and communication of defender detection to shooters. Although
delays were modeled before, the very realistic effects of non-linear congestion
and queuing was not explicitly represented. It may be seen that additional state
variables are now required to minimally specify the dynamical state of the
system. As before,
Ru (t) = Number of undetected live (potentially active) Defenders present in
the region at time t,
Ra (t) = Number of newly-acquired live Defenders present at time f,
Rd(t) = Number of detected live /functional Defenders present at time t,
D(t) = Number of detected and misclassified as live, but actually dead,
Defenders present at time t.
The Defenders enumerated by Rd{t) and D(r) are viewed as targetable, i.e.
eligible for Attacker engagement; they are effectively "queued up" for shooter
service. Additionally, we wish to define and enumerate those Defenders that
have been engaged and await classification as to damage status (BDA) and
possible attacker response or service:
Sa {t) = Number of live unclassified Defenders that have been engaged /shot
at by Attackers, at t
,
Sd(t) = Number of dead unclassified Defenders present at time t
Note that all such variables might be treated as state variables of a multidimen-
sional birth-death Markov stochastic process. A mathematically explicit
treatment of such a setup appears cumbersome, but simulation models have been
written to allow the effects of randomness to be investigated.
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Parameters of the Model
T = Maximum number of Defenders allowed in the region
simultaneously by the Defender decision makers. This parameter is,
in effect, a control variable.
X = Arrival rate of Defender (targets) to area. Note that the overall
arrival rate is here allowed to depend on a hypothetical goal for the
Defenders, T. Additions are made on the basis of current Defender
count deficiency from the goal level.
jj. = Rate at which Defenders are "served" by an Attacker-shooter.
sd = Number of shooters; these are viewed as individual servers that
engage Defender targets for a given time.
77 = Rate at which Defenders are served by the Attacker's C2 system,
viewed as a (saturable) service subsystem.
su = Number of C2 servers possessed by the Attacker force.
v = Individual rate at which Defenders (Red targets) are lost from track
but are still in the region.
a = Individual rate at which Defenders are active (e.g. shooting), hence
causing potential damage but also revealing their presence;
equivalently, 1/ a is the expected time between shots by a Defender.
£ = Rate of acquisition of Defenders by Attacker surveillance (a sweep-
width concept).
y = Rate at which Defenders leave the region; equivalently 1/yis the
expected time that a Red Defender spends in the region (if it is not
killed).
PK = Single-shot probability with which a Blue Attacker kills a Red
Defender.
Caa = Probability that an engaged Defender that is still alive is correctly
classified as being alive; cad = 1 - caa is the probability of misclassi-
fication of a live Defending target as dead.
Cda = Probability that an engaged Defender that has been killed (is dead)
is misclassified as being alive; Cdd = 1 - Cda is the probability of
correctly classifying a dead Defending target as dead.
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Saturable C2 Service Submodels
For the deterministic modeling of saturable service by the C2 facility and by
the Attacker-shooters (presumably missile launchers in the present context) we
make use of the following approximations, (again Filipiak (1988)): for the C2 rate
of service, i.e. of refining and processing information concerning those Defenders
detected, we use
Hc (t) = H(Ra (t) + Sa (t) + Sd (ty,ri,Sc)
ARa (t)+sa (t) + sd (t)}nsc <41 >
l+ [Ra (t) + Sa (t) + Sd (tj\
and for the rate of processing by shooters,
Hs (t) = H{Rd (t) + D(t);ii,sD )
jRd (t) + D(t)]usD (4 -2)
l + [Rd (t) + D(t)]'
Both of these expressions reflect the saturability of the respective service systems.
It is argued, e.g. for the C2 service system, that the load or backlog on the system
is the sum of (a) Ra (t), the number of acquired Defenders never before engaged;
(b) Sa (t), these previously-engaged and alive but unclassified at t; and (c) Sd(t),
these Defenders previously engaged that are dead but unclassified at t. These
constitute the entire load seen by the C2 system; that load is processed at
individual rate 77, so for small load the gross processing rate is proportional to that
load, while if that load grows the gross service rate saturates at the overall gross
rate rise, as it should. An identical argument holds for the shooter service facility
behavior.
We also incorporate a static (time and event independent) weighting/control
scheme that prioritizes the server attention to the different classes of targets.
Again for the C2 service, we allow different C2 service emphasis on, for instance,
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the newly-detected Defender targets that have not yet been engaged than on the
previously engaged, but not-yet-damage-classified. The weights can be made to
adapt to changing backlogs and opportunities, i.e. to represent "emerging
behavior", but no details are given at present.
State Transition Equations
Here are the state transition equations proposed to represent the enhanced
model.
dt
Ru (t) + Ra {t) + Rd (t) + Sa (t)
T
Defender entry rate to region
(or emergence from hiding).
Controlled by Red
+ v{Ra (t) + Rd (t) + Sa (t)) -
v
„
Rate of loss of track of
Defenders under track at t
+
wsSa (t) + wARa (t)
zvaRa (t) + ws (Sa (t) + Sd (t))
CU ad
Rate that unclassified live targets
are designated by C2 as dead
(back to undiscovered status)
{7 + a + ^Ru {t)
Rate of loss: leave region (ff^>);
detection as a consequence of
Defender action (or); detection of










Defenders by their action (a)
and by Blue surveillance (£)
^jggft)
*>ARa(t) + V>s(Sa(t) + Sd {t))





region (7) or track loss




Rate of C2 system classification
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Numerical Examples
Table 1 presents steady-state results of Model III with parameters T = 100,
A = 10, pk = 0.7, v = 0.5, y = 0.5, a - 1, cad = Cda = 0.3, ws = wa = 1. Displayed are





Note that increasing the acquisition rate % from 1 to 10 when rjsjj = 10 and
fJSD = 10 or 20 does not change the Defender shooting and attrition rates by
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much; this behavior is due to saturation of the C2 server. Increasing that capacity,
as measured by 77s u, to 30 allows the Defender shooting and attrition rates to
become more sensitive to changes in £ and fjsr).
TABLE 1
Defender Shooting Rates and Defender Attrition Rates
for Model with C2 Server
T = 100, A = 10, pK = 0.7, V = 0.5, 7= 0.5, a = 1, ca& - Cda = 0.3, ws = wA = 1
1 1 10
I^D 10 20 10 20
Defender Rate of Defender Rate of Defender Rate of Defender Rate of
Shooting Attrition Shooting Attrition Shooting Attrition Shooting Attrition
r\su
10 12.7 2.4 12.4 2.6 12.6 2.5 12.3 2.6
20 10.3 3.8 9.1 4.6 9.8 4.1 8.4 5.0
30 9.7 4.2 7.6 5.5 8.9 4.7 5.6 6.6
5. Concluding Discussion
The equations describing the models in this report have been solved
numerically, beginning with various hypothetical initial conditions, and the
results are intuitively agreeable. Various functionals of these solutions that are
operationally meaningful and informative can also be numerically evaluated; e.g.
the (expected) number of weapons fired by each side up to tie t; this is the
important MOE inventory expenditure. Cumulative attrition can also be computed,
as well as the effect of attacks SCUD firings. It is the dependence of such MOEs
upon system properties, such as surveillance capability, including the adequacy
of BDA assessment, and attrition capability by defense shooters that the models
will help to clarify. Tradeoffs can be uncovered, and the operational value of
certain proposed system enhancements revealed. We plan to cover this
exploration phase more extensively in later work.
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In Part II of this report series we study the effect of adaptive policies that
regulate both attacker and defender changes in region H\> occupancy as a
consequence of experience. Some such control phenomenon is dependent on
perception, which may well be faulty. In subsequent work still more realistic
issues are included.
Finally, it is emphasized that this modeling effort is purposefully aggregated
and broad-brush so that quick turnaround results are possible. The deterministic
models presented here can be very quickly exercised on modern PCs. The
simulation models that follow these are similarly quickly run. Such a feature
means that considerable exploration is possible before the high-resolution
digging begins. We are convinced that the preliminary spadework described can
efficiently locate paydirt for later exploitation.
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